Price, Piracy, and Search: Which Pirates Respond to Changes in the Legal Price?

In stock
SKU
48.4.09

Publication History

Received: September 22, 2022
Revised: July 7, 2023; August 15, 2023; January 2, 2024
Accepted: February 5, 2024
Published as Forthcoming: July 17, 2024
Published as Articles in Advance: November 4, 2024
Published in Issue: December 1, 2024

https://doi.org/10.25300/MISQ/2024/18466 

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Abstract

Prior research suggests that high prices may motivate the decision to pirate entertainment goods. We analyzed a natural experiment that decreased the tax rate, and hence also the net prices of e-books, by 14% in Ireland while several other European countries were not affected. Using country-specific data on piracy visits, we found that this price decrease caused only a small and statistically insignificant decrease in total e-book piracy visits. However, we further decomposed piracy visits into those of direct pirates, who navigated directly to piracy sites, and indirect pirates, who searched to find piracy sites. The 14% price decrease caused no change in direct piracy visits but caused a statistically significant 27% decrease in indirect piracy visits. These findings align with prior research suggesting that search can play an important role in piracy, but only for some pirates. Our results demonstrate the potential of using price to mitigate piracy, but they also highlight the challenges firms face in competing with piracy for experienced pirates. We conclude by detailing both the policy and managerial implications of our work.

Additional Details
Author Koushyar Rajavi, Brett Danaher, and Jesse Newby
Year 2024
Volume 48
Issue 4
Keywords Digital piracy, pricing, information goods, natural experiment, generalized synthetic control
Page Numbers 1537-1558
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